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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the prospects of conflict caused by water scarcity in China, 
India, and Pakistan.  The thesis uses indicators of water tensions including: water quality, 
water quantity, the management of water, state institutions and national water philosophy.  
On its own, water shortage will unlikely be the only cause of regional conflict; however, 
the resource may be one catalyst of conflict or instability in the already fragile region. 
The indicators studied throughout this thesis continue to deteriorate and are anticipated to 
reach unacceptable levels by the year 2025.  The current water dilemma in Asia increases 
the likelihood for regional conflict if practical solutions are not obtained. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................3 
1. Global Water Shortages: The Reality ................................................3 
2. Asian Water Conflict: The Sino-South Asian Aspect.......................7 
3. Conflict Over Water: An Historical Perspective ..............................7 
4. Debates on Water Wars.......................................................................8 
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS..............................................10 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES...........................................................11 
1. Methodology .......................................................................................11 
2. Sources ................................................................................................12 
3. Thesis Outline.....................................................................................12 
II. CHINA’S WATER CRISIS: THE PROBLEM, CAUSES AND POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS ..............................................................................................................13 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................13 
B. SOURCES OF CHINA’S WATER ..............................................................14 
1. Glaciers ...............................................................................................14 
2. Surface Water.....................................................................................15 
3. Ground Water ....................................................................................18 
C. CHINA’S WATER RESOURCES: EXAMINING ITS PRIMARY 
USERS.............................................................................................................18 
1. Domestic Use.......................................................................................19 
2. Agricultural Use .................................................................................20 
3. Industrial Use .....................................................................................20 
D. THE ROAD TO CRISIS: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO 
CHINA’S IMMINENT WATER EMERGENCY ......................................21 
1. Inefficient Use.....................................................................................22 
2. Pollution..............................................................................................23 
E. GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD EXECUTION: BEIJING’S EFFORTS 
TO MITIGATE THIS CRISIS.....................................................................24 
1. Beijing’s “Top-Down Approach” – The 1988 Water Law.............25 
2. 2002 Water Law Revision .................................................................26 
3. Colossal Water Diversion Projects: Beijing’s Near-Term 
Solution ...............................................................................................28 
F. CHINESE WATER SCARCITY: THE CONSEQUENCES.....................29 
1. Are Beijing’s Policies Killing China’s People?................................30 
2. Economic Regression.........................................................................30 
3. Interstate Conflict ..............................................................................31 
G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................31 
 viii
III. THE SOUTH ASIAN WATER CRISIS: THE PROBLEM, CAUSES AND 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS..........................................................................................35 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................35 
B. THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICT: THE PARTITION OF INDIA AND 
PAKISTAN.....................................................................................................36 
C. 1948: THE REASON FOR THE INDUS WATER TREATY...................38 
D. 1960 INDUS WATER TREATY ..................................................................39 
E. NUCLEAR NATIONS...................................................................................40 
F. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES: IS THE TREATY STILL 
RELEVANT? .................................................................................................42 
G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................44 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION.....................................................47 
A. SUMMARIZING THE ISSUES ...................................................................47 
B. ASIAN FOREIGN POLICY: WHAT DOES THE U.S. HAVE TO 
LOSE?.............................................................................................................48 
C. PRESERVING NATURAL RESOURCES: ARE WE SET UP TO 
SUCCEED? ....................................................................................................50 
D. FINAL ANALYSIS........................................................................................51 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................53 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................59 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The Tibetan Plateau. ..........................................................................................3 
Figure 2. Projected Water Scarcity in 2025. .....................................................................4 
Figure 3. Water Availability in China, India and Pakistan. ..............................................6 
Figure 4. Methodology. ...................................................................................................11 
Figure 5. China’s Water Dilemma. .................................................................................13 
Figure 6. The Tibetan Plateau and China’s Major Rivers...............................................15 
Figure 7. China’s Three Gorges Dam. ............................................................................17 
Figure 8. The South to North Water Diversion Project...................................................28 
Figure 9. The Wullar Barrage Project. ............................................................................42 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Without my wife’s support, my life would not be where it is today.  Sarah, I want 
to thank you for your support during the long hours, deployments, and the endless 
moving.  Additionally, I want to thank you for ensuring our family is well taken care of 
on a daily basis. 
Thanks to my mom for instilling the importance of education in my life.  Without 
her support and guidance, I would not have made it this far in my educational journey.  
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis examines how China’s growing water requirements may affect 
Beijing’s relations with South Asia.  China’s shrinking water resources may lead Beijing 
to build dams and take other actions on the Tibetan Plateau in order to address this 
growing concern.1  The Tibetan Plateau serves as an untapped resource for China and is 
the origin of many neighboring countries essential water supplies.  More specifically, the 
Tibetan Plateau is the origin of India and Pakistan’s great rivers – the Indus, Ganges, and 
Brahmaputra.  The decision to focus on the Tibetan Plateau as a solution to China’s water 
crisis will likely will affect the Brahmaputra River, essential to India.  Additionally, 
although less likely due to geographical challenges, Beijing’s decision to dam Tibetan 
rivers could also impact the Indus and Ganges River, essential to India and Pakistan.  The 
ongoing tension between India and Pakistan over critical water resources in the Kashmir 
region sets the stage for increased regional tension if Beijing moves forward with its 
proposed plans.  The consequences of such actions could include a degradation of 
recently improved relations among these countries, and even to armed conflict. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Water scarcity is a serious issue in many countries around the world.  Historically, 
water-related crises originated in the Middle East – occasionally leading to armed conflict 
                                                 
1 Environment and Development Desk, Department of Information and International Relations, 
Central Tibetan Administration, Tibet: A Human Development and Environment Report, 2007, Chapter 
Five, 126-129 http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/pubs/edi/tib2007/chap-5.pdf (accessed 2 September 2008); 
Brahma Chellaney, “China Aims for Bigger Share of South Asia’s Water Lifeline,” Yale Global Online, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=9377 (accessed 2 September 2008); Brahma Chellaney, 
“Averting Water Wars in Asia The Next Struggle,” 27 June 2007: 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/982359/averting_water_wars_in_asia_the_next_struggle/index.html
?source=r_science (accessed 2 September 2008); Claude Arpi, “Diverting the Brahmaputra: Declaration of 
War?”, http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/27spec.htm (accessed 2 September 2008); Keith Schneider 
and C. T. Pope, “China, Tibet, and the Strategic Power of Water,” 
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/world/china-tibet-and-the-strategic-power-of-water/ (accessed 2 
September 2008). 
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over the resource.  Recently, however, Asia has increasingly faced a steady reduction in 
fresh water availability.2  These water dilemmas, in conjunction with ineffective policies 
concerning shared resources, may set in motion a chain of events resulting in future 
armed conflict between China, India, and Pakistan.  
In order to prevent a potential disaster, it is important to identify the problem at 
hand.  China, India, and Pakistan are all reliant on shared water supplies originating in the 
Tibetan Plateau (see Figure 1).3  For China, the Tibetan Plateau serves as an unexploited 
resource that could help to resolve a mounting water crisis.  For India and Pakistan, the 
Tibetan Plateau serves as the starting point for their most important water lifelines – the 
Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Indus River.4  In either case, as water requirements rise for 
these countries and as resources shrink, it is becoming clear that efforts to tap these 
resources may foster competition – possibly leading to interstate conflict.  Therefore, it is 
crucial to identify the current status of the availability of water, examine the causes of the 
shortages, and discuss the proposed solutions that directly affect the possible outcome of 
this evolving situation. 
 
                                                 
2 Chietigj Bajpaee, Power and Interest News Report, ”Asia’s Coming Water Wars,” 22 August 2006: 
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=545&language_id=1 (accessed 25 October 
2007); Vandana Shiva, Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 
2002); Brahma Chellaney, “Averting Water Wars in Asia The Next Struggle,” 27 June 2007: 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/982359/averting_water_wars_in_asia_the_next_struggle/index.html
?source=r_science (accessed 3 October 2007). 
3 Yang Qinye and Zheng Du, Tibetan Geography (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2004), 62. 
4 Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus River: A Study of the Effects of Partition (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1967). 
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Figure 1.   The Tibetan Plateau. 
This research will provide insight into the severity of the issue and how these 
countries are handling it.  Additionally, it will explore the pros and cons of proposed 
solutions that might benefit the parties concerned.  In other words, it will assess the 
extent to which all parties might benefit from a peaceful negotiation regarding these 
resources – possibly resulting in new or expanded treaties – and the degree to which the 
parties appear prepared either to accept such negotiated solutions or to seek unilateral 
advantage in confrontations and conflict. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Global Water Shortages: The Reality 
Few scholars dispute the likelihood of future wars over water.  Despite varying 
theories as to why this resource is dwindling (including global warming, population 
growth, pollution, and mismanaged resources), the conclusions remain the same – the 
world’s water is becoming scarce, and this scarcity will likely contribute to regional 
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instability and conflict (see Figure 2).5  The issue of global water shortages does not get 
the attention as other high-profile resources do such as oil, natural gas, diamonds, timber 
and minerals.  The supply of fresh water in many countries is already at a critical point – 
particularly in China, India, and Pakistan, home to over half of the world’s population.  
Due to these massive populations, national resource requirements, and ineffective 
resource-sharing policies, the potential for water wars involving these three countries is 
significant.6 
 
Figure 2.   Projected Water Scarcity in 2025. 
The International Water Management Institute (IWMI), whose mission is to 
improve the management of land and water resources for food, livelihood, and nature, has 
reported that approximately a quarter of the world’s population lives in areas facing 
“physical water shortages.”7  Furthermore, the IWMI assesses that a third of the world’s 
population is suffering from a shortage of water, raising the prospect of “water crisis” in 
                                                 
5 Chietigj Bajpaee , ”Asia’s Coming Water Wars;” Vandana Shiva, Water Wars. 
6 Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 257; Chietigj Bajpaee , ”Asia’s Coming Water Wars;” 
Vandana Shiva, Water Wars. 
7 International Water Management Institute (IWMI), 
http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/assessment/files_new/newsroom/FinancialTimes_World_2006.pdf  (accessed 6 
September 2007). 
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countries such as China, India, and Pakistan.8  The potential for water conflict is greatest 
in developing countries that lack effective tools for the proper management of this 
resource.9  In Asia, the many attempts to curtail this problem include the Mekong River 
Committee (1957) and its successor, the Mekong River Commission, the treaties of 
Sarada (1920), Kosi (1954), and Gandak (1959) between India and Nepal, the Indus 
Water Treaty between India and Pakistan (1960), the Ganges Waters Treaty between 
India and Bangladesh (1977), and the 1998 Agreement on the Use of Water and Energy 
Resources of the Syr Darya Basin between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.10  A weakness 
that these agreements share is an overall unwillingness of their signatories to modify 
them over time, and the lack of enforcement – leaving their effectiveness open to 
question. 
The irony of living on a planet that is over two-thirds water and facing a potential 
world wide water shortage may seem a difficult concept to grasp.  However, it is slowly 
becoming reality.  The facts and figures that underlie this unfortunate truth paint a 
gloomy picture that clearly sets the stage for an increased likelihood of conflict over 
water.  For example, in 1998, 28 countries reported experiencing water scarcity, and that 
number is expected to rise to 56 by 2025.11  Additionally, between 1990 and 2025, the 
projected number of people affected by these limited water supplies will rise from 131 
million to 817 million.12 
The definition of water scarcity has changed over the years.  Mathematical 
researchers provide a quantitative definition as a country in which available water is 
lower than 1,000 cubic meters per person per year; at this point, the health and economic 
development of a nation are considered to be vulnerable.13  Furthermore, if available 
                                                 
8 IWMI; Chietigj Bajpaee , ”Asia’s Coming Water Wars;” Vandana Shiva, Water Wars. 
9 Chietigj Bajpaee , ”Asia’s Coming Water Wars.” 
10 Ibid. 
11 Vandana Shiva, Water Wars, 1; Waternunc, http://www.waternunc.com/gb/pws2025.htm (accessed 
8 September 2007). 
12 Vandana Shiva, Water Wars, 1. 
13 Ibid. 
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water drops below 500 cubic meters, people's survival is grievously compromised.  
Historical comparisons indicate that China, India, and Pakistan’s status as water-scarce 
countries are approaching quickly (see Figure 3).  In 1951, India’s annual water 
availability per person was 5,277 cubic meters.  In the 1990s, it fell to 2,464 cubic 
meters.  By 2025, it is projected to fall dangerously close to the 1,000 cubic meters 
level.14  As for China, its water availability per person was 4,597 in 1950 and 2,427 in the 
1990s – slightly above the sufficiency threshold level.  However, by 2025, it is assessed 
that China’s water availability will plummet to 1,818 cubic meters – an alarming number 
for an approximate population of 1.5 billion.15  Finally, Pakistan’s water availability per 
person in 1950 was an amazing 10,590 cubic meters per person.  However, it fell 
drastically to 3,962 in the 1990s and is projected to level out at 1,803 by 2025. 
 
Figure 3.   Water Availability in China, India and Pakistan. 
In contrast, a qualitative approach to understanding water scarcity focuses on the 
practical aspect of having limited access to this critical resource.  This research method 
defines water scarcity by identifying a list of distinctive characteristics that must be 
present in an identified area.  They include the need to carry heavy pots of water several 
                                                 
14 Vandana Shiva, Water Wars, 1. 
15 Charles Wolf, Jr., K.C. Yeh, Benjamin Zycher, Nicholas Eberstadt, Sung-Ho Lee,  Fault Lines in 
China’s Economic Terrain, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), 75.  
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miles every day to meet household needs, poverty caused by farmers losing their land or 
the landless losing their jobs because of a lack of irrigation water, the loss of wetlands or 
estuaries because of upstream water depletion, and water pollution giving rise to the 
incidence of water-borne diseases.16  The qualitative approach highlights the potential 
human toll this shortage could affect and the possible motivations behind a decision to go 
to war over it. 
2. Asian Water Conflict: The Sino-South Asian Aspect 
Asia’s growing economic importance highlights the need to maintain regional 
stability among all countries.  Therefore, the technical definition of water scarcity is as 
important as what is being done about it.  In order to address the problem, it is crucial to 
acknowledge the growing crisis and identify a solution prior to the outbreak of hostilities.  
The fact is that the availability of fresh water is dropping and a severe depletion could 
threaten the survival of a country’s people.  Since the 1970s, the global per capita water 
supply has declined by 33 percent.17  It is at the point of self-preservation that the concern 
for conflict arises.   
In light of the recently improved relations between New Delhi, Islamabad and 
Beijing, it is important to assess the potential for a peaceful resolution among these 
countries over this issue.  Therefore, it is crucial to examine the historical context behind 
these tensions, the current players and polices, and the potential impact of regional 
conflict on relations between these countries. 
3. Conflict Over Water: An Historical Perspective 
History is rife with accounts of conflict over water.  These conflicts range from 
water being used as a military tool, as an expression of religious beliefs, and as a key 
factor in developmental disputes.  Additionally, these water-related conflicts span the 
globe, and everyone facing water scarcity is exposed to possible conflict over it.  The 
                                                 
16 IWMI; Alan Dupont, East Asia Imperiled: Transnational Challenges to Security, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 120-121. 
17 Vandana Shiva, Water Wars, 1. 
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majority of historical accounts of water conflict involve domestic disputes.  With this in 
mind, the first recorded intrastate conflict over water took place between two Sumerian 
cities during the Lagash-Umma border dispute in 2,500 BC.18  In this instance, the 
disruption of water was used as a military tool.  While many water disputes that followed 
were intrastate, the same themes resurface at every point.  Water can be used as a 
strategic military tool as well as the cause of serious internal disputes.19 
Historical accounts support the claim that conflict over water tends to occur at an 
intrastate level; however, it is the escalation to the interstate level that concerns most 
scholars.20  It is at this level that regional stability and security come into question.  If 
allowed to reach this level, the potential of quickly resolving the conflict is low.  
Therefore, it is crucial to identify what causes interstate water tension.  In most cases, 
these issues are the result of undeveloped resources and a lack of “structural stability” 
(where capable, accountable and responsive structures exist to peacefully manage and 
mitigate conflict and ensure respect for institutions and the rule of law).21  As Asia 
becomes a new focal point for water conflict, it is critical to devote attention to this 
region. 
4. Debates on Water Wars 
An interstate war over water could have exceptionally grave consequences for 
regional security and stability.  There are two major views on the possibility of an Asian 
water war.  The first holds that it is only a matter of time before major powers in Asia – 
China, India, and Pakistan in particular – wage a full-scale war over these resources.  The 
                                                 
18 Water Conflict Chronology, http://worldwater.org/conflictchronology.pdf (accessed 3 October 
2007); David W. Koeller, “ Stele of the Vultures: War Between Umma and Lagash,” 
http://www.thenagain.info/Classes/Sources/UmmaLagash.html (accessed 13 May 2008). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Water Conflict Chronology, http://worldwater.org/conflictchronology.pdf (accessed 3 October 
2007); David W. Koeller, “Stele of the Vultures: War Between Umma and Lagash,” 
http://www.thenagain.info/Classes/Sources/UmmaLagash.html (accessed 13 May 2008). 
21 OECD, “Water and Violent Conflict,” 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water/2005/052605waterconflict.pdf (accessed 3 October 
2007). 
 9
second view maintains that a major war will break out only if plans to resolve water 
shortages, specifically in China, are not put into action. 
Proponents of the first view, such as Fred Pearce, Chietigj Bajpaee and Vandana 
Shiva, highlight the continued depletion of water resources and the lack of significant 
action to rectify the shortages.  For example, in a recent interview, Pearce said, “Water 
conflicts of various sorts are happening all over the arid parts of the world. As more and 
more water is collected behind dams, and otherwise controlled, it is the powerful that get 
access to the water and the weak that lose. So there is a serious global issue about water 
governance.”22  Furthermore, Shiva highlighted the severity of the problem when she 
quoted economist Jack Hirshleifer:  
Such abstract arguments miss the most crucial point - when water 
disappears, there is no alternative. For Third World women, water scarcity 
means traveling longer distances in search of water. For peasants, it means 
starvation and destitution as drought wipes out their crops. For children, it 
means dehydration and death. There is simply no substitute for this 
precious liquid, necessary for the biological survival of animals and 
plants.23   
As a result, it is assumed that these countries, when faced with the harsh reality of 
not being able to sustain their booming populations, will do whatever it takes to fix the 
problem – without considering the potential impact on their neighbors.  These actions, it 
is agreed, will cause a domino effect, possibly leading to war. 
The second view relates to the first; however, it highlights the need to turn 
conjecture into reality.  Brahma Chellaney, Sandra L. Postel, and Aaron T. Wolf, all 
major proponents of this view, understand that conflict over diminishing water resources 
is possible.24  Chellaney holds that “interstate conflict, however, will surface only when 
an idea is translated into action to benefit one country at the expense of a neighboring 
                                                 
22 Paul Comstock, California Literary Review Fred Pearce Interview, April 3, 2007: 
http://calitreview.com/2007/04/03/an-interview-with-fred-pearce (accessed 1 November 2007). 
23 Vandana Shiva, Water Wars, 15. 
24 Brahma Chellaney, “Averting Water Wars in Asia The Next Struggle;” Sandra L. Postel and Aaron 
T. Wolf, Global Policy Forum, “Dehydrating Conflict,” September 18, 2001: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water/2001/1001fpol.htm (accessed 1 November 2007).  
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one.”25  Additionally, analysts at the Swedish Water House believe that “the loudest 
alarmist calls for future ‘water wars’ have died away. Still, water as a source of 
international conflict seems to not only loom large in the public mind, but also in political 
circles.”26  In other words, Asia will not face a war over water unless these actors (China, 
India, and Pakistan) actually act on proposed ideas to the detriment of others.27  While 
they also acknowledge the overall depletion of world-wide water sources as a major 
concern, they do not agree that the mere fact will necessarily spiral Asia into war. 
Regardless of their point of view, these scholars understand the importance of 
averting a water crisis in Asia.  The differences are small, but they are all trying to 
accomplish a similar goal – raising awareness that the potential for war over water is a 
reality and that steps to avert conflict need be taken prior to the commencement of battle.  
Furthermore, they emphasize statistics that should raise eyebrows regarding the potential 
flash points between these countries and that highlight the problems that may arise as a 
result of conflict. 
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
The major question that is addressed in this thesis is whether China’s growing 
need for water resources will lead it to turn rhetoric into action by modifying the flow of 
key South Asian water sources originating in the Tibetan Plateau.  China, India, and 
Pakistan are currently experiencing severe water shortages.  This shared burden serves as 
the common denominator that could cause this situation to spiral out of control.  
Additionally, India and Pakistan have deep-seated tensions surrounding water issues due 
to a hasty partition in 1947.  Therefore, if these actions are taken without any formal 
agreements or venues to resolve disputes, it may lead to major conflict and regional  
 
                                                 
25 Brahma Chellaney, “Averting Water Wars in Asia The Next Struggle.” 
26 Swedish Water House, “Water and Conflict: a brief review of the academic literature and other 
sources,” October 2004, 3: 
http://www.swedishwaterhouse.se/swh/resources/20050310144027Water_and_Local_Conflict.pdf 
(accessed 1 November 2007). 
27 Ibid. 
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instability despite recently improved relations between these countries.  This thesis 
attempts to determine whether peaceful solutions are feasible, and whether the risk of 
conflict is significant.  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1. Methodology 
This thesis uses a case study methodology to examine the effect that interstate 
competition over shared water resources might have on regional stability.  Historically, 
the Middle East has been the focus of these concerns.  However, recent evidence gathered 
indicates that by 2030 Asia could be facing a severely depleted water reserves.  As a 
result, China, India, and Pakistan will be faced with major decisions with regard to 
ensuring their countries have ample water supplies.  The outcome, if not handled 
properly, could result in conflict. 
The analysis posits that there is a distinct pattern of independent variables (IV), 
dependent variables (DV) and intervening variables (IntV) in the two principal possible 
scenarios – interstate war or interstate agreement (see figure 4).  In all cases, it is 
assumed, China, India and Pakistan face an inevitable crisis unless actions are taken to 
prevent water shortages and competition prior to the outbreak of violence.  Therefore, the 
study shows that water scarcity, shared water sources and nuclear weapons are IV’s 
affecting the DV’s of interstate war or agreements.  Furthermore, interstate competition 
over water serves as an IntV for interstate war, while interstate cooperation serves as an 
IntV for the conclusion of agreements. 
 
Figure 4.   Methodology. 
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This thesis investigates the hypothesis that China’s water crisis could, if not 
addressed in the near term, exacerbate regional tensions, possibly leading to war and 
serious regional instability. 
2. Sources 
There is an abundance of sources that focus on the world wide water crisis, South 
Asian water issues, and Chinese water problems.  This thesis relies on numerous primary 
and secondary sources to provide a synopsis of the current trends in the relations among 
China, India and Pakistan.  Additionally, the thesis leans heavily on statistical sources 
that quantify the potential for regional crisis over water.  Finally, the use of maps 
throughout this thesis is critical to understanding the degree to which these countries are 
dependant on regional water sources.  These sources provide the knowledge base 
required to make a reasonable assessment of the likelihood of conflict. 
3. Thesis Outline 
This thesis will begin by examining the overall world-wide water crisis in Chapter 
I.  It will discuss the importance of the issue and discuss the current literature surrounding 
the problem.  Chapter II will begin focusing on the countries of interest.  It will start by 
looking at China’s dilemma and its proposals to mitigate the impending water crisis 
through the building of massive dams and water diversion projects.  Additionally, it will 
discuss its plans to focus efforts on the Tibetan Plateau as a solution to the countries 
water crisis.  Chapter III will discuss the history of tension surrounding India and 
Pakistan.  More specifically, it will note India and Pakistan’s water scarcity issues and 
their efforts to address the problem via the 1960 Indus Water Treaty.   
Finally, Chapter IV will discuss whether Beijing will turn rhetoric into action and 
the consequences associated with its options.  Additionally, it will highlight the fact that 
there is no formal setting for countries in this region to settle disputes.  It will also 
provide recommendations on what can be done to resolve the potential for conflict and 
the importance to the U.S. 
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II. CHINA’S WATER CRISIS: THE PROBLEM, CAUSES AND 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
China’s access to fresh water is diminishing at a disturbing rate.  Failure by 
Beijing to develop reasonable solutions may lead to insufficient accessible fresh water for 
Chinese citizens.  Beijing’s current solutions focus on massive projects that require 
significant financial commitment and cause an almost unnecessary burden on the people.  
Aside from the apparent financial burden, these projects also take a toll on farms, the 
ecology, and the forced migration of those in the vicinity of these projects.28  These 
projects focus on long-term solutions.  However, China’s water situation is reaching a 
point at which long-term fixes may be too little too late (see Figure 5).29 
 
Figure 5.   China’s Water Dilemma. 
                                                 
28 Carin Zissis, “China’s Environmental Crisis,” 9 February 2007 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12608/chinas_environmental_crisis.html#10 (accessed 13 May 2008). 
29 Figure 5 was taken from Dr. John McAlister, “China’s Water Crisis,” 22 March 2005, 
http://www.cbiz.cn/download/aquabio.pdf (accessed 14 November 2007). 
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Beijing’s “top down” approach at managing this problem and reluctance to 
propose practical solutions may cause an irreversible water dilemma in China – 
ultimately eliminating China’s water self-sufficiency.30  If allowed to reach this level, 
Beijing will need to look elsewhere in order to address its needs.  These more extreme 
solutions may require tapping into water resources located on the Tibetan Plateau that 
also supplies China’s neighbors.  If forced to do this, the lack of interstate water 
agreements and the already present regional tension over water may serve as a flash point 
for conflict. 
This chapter examines China’s water problem and how it relates to India and 
Pakistan.  More specifically, it determines the major causes of this problem, and it 
evaluates how Beijing is trying to mitigate them and address some of the regional 
security implications.  The result is a better understanding of China’s efforts to save its 
environment and how lack of action may lead to more significant issues – including 
massive human suffering, economic regression, and possible conflict with its neighbors. 
B. SOURCES OF CHINA’S WATER 
There are three main sources of China’s water.  They are glaciers, surface water 
and ground water.  Currently, the overall volume of fresh water is not the main issue.  
The main issue is how China is treating the water it has access to.  As discussed below, 
China’s industries, massive population, and resource mismanagement are all contributing 
to its current water crisis.  The bottom line is that China’s access to fresh water and 
overall water levels are diminishing. 
1. Glaciers 
The Tibetan Plateau serves as a primary source of China’s water.  It covers most 
of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai province in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).  Some 49,873 square kilometers of this plateau serve as the source of China’s two 
                                                 
30 Wang Xinbo, The Water Revolution (2006), 147. 
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main rivers – the Yellow River and the Yangtze River.31  In addition, the Tibetan Plateau 
serves as a life-line for China’s neighbors, including India and Pakistan via the Indus, 
Ganges and Brahmaputra River systems.32 
2. Surface Water 
China’s surface water is provided by five main rivers and numerous lakes.  These 
resources are continually replenished by glacial melting and rainfall (see Figure 6).33 
These sources of water are currently feeling the most significant impact of China’s water 
dilemma.  China maximizes the use of these rivers and lakes to generate hydroelectric 
power, to support transportation, and to support industrial expansion.  However, it comes 
at a great cost to the environment.  These dams and industrial facilities are draining 
China’s water supply to a point that could not only cause the eventual drying up of these 
rivers, but leave its citizens without access to fresh water. 
 
Figure 6.   The Tibetan Plateau and China’s Major Rivers. 
                                                 
31 WWF Nepal Program, “An Overview of Glaciers, Glacier Retreat, and Subsequent Impacts in 
Nepal, India and China,” March 2005, 39, 
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/himalayaglaciersreport2005.pdf (accessed 14 November 2007). 
32 WWF Nepal Program, “An Overview of Glaciers, Glacier Retreat, and Subsequent Impacts in 
Nepal, India and China”; Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), 24-25. 
33 Figure acquired from http://www.chinacp.com/eng/cppolicystrategy/cp_rivers_lakes.html (accessed 
14 November 2007). 
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Of China’s major rivers, the Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers are the most 
important.  The Yangtze is 3,900 miles long – making it the longest river in China.34  It 
runs south out of the Tibetan Plateau and eventually turns east across central China.  On 
its way to the South China Sea, the Yangtze River flows through the Three Gorges 
Dam.35  This river serves two main purposes for China.  First, it is a major transportation 
route in south China.  Second, it provides a significant source of electrical power with the 
recent completion of the Three Gorges Dam.36  However, these advantages are not 
without consequences.  The Three Gorges Dam is the source of major pollution up 
stream.  While the dam produces energy, it does not allow the free flow of the river.  As a 
result, the water becomes heavily polluted due to the restricted flow.  Additionally, the 
construction of the dam resulted in the displacement of numerous Chinese citizens – two 
issues Beijing is currently struggling to address (see figure 7).37  Therefore, the decision 
to protect the environment by limiting the amount of dams restricting the flow of China’s 
rivers versus continued economic progress is the primary source of contention. 
                                                 
34 Cleaner Production in China, Rivers and Lakes Identified for Environmental Protection, 
http://www.chinacp.com/eng/cppolicystrategy/cp_rivers_lakes.html#ChangJiang (accessed 14 November 
2007). 
35 New York Times, “Chinese Dam Projects Criticized for Their Human Costs,” Jim Yardley, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/world/asia/19dam.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ei=5089&en=e41f237
d379a6b10&ex=1353214800&partner=rssyahoo&emc=rss (accessed 19 November 2007). 
36 Cleaner Production in China, Rivers and Lakes Identified for Environmental Protection, 
http://www.chinacp.com/eng/cppolicystrategy/cp_rivers_lakes.html#ChangJiang (accessed 14 November 
2007); Three Gorges Bulletin, Progress of the Three Gorges Project, 
http://www.zhb.gov.cn/english/quality/3Gorges/index.htm (accessed 14 November 2007); Tibetan Bulletin 
Online, “Policy Implications of Current Dam Projects on Drichu – the Upper Yangtze River,” Tashi 
Tsering, http://www.tibet.net/en/tibbul/2005/0102/environment1.html, (accessed 14 November 2007). 
37 International Rivers, “Three Gorges Dam,” http://internationalrivers.org/en/image/tid/111?page=1 
(accessed 13 May 2008). 
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Figure 7.   China’s Three Gorges Dam. 
The Yellow River is the second longest river in China – estimated to be 3,390 
miles long.  The Yellow River, like the Yangtze River, also begins at the Tibetan Plateau.  
It runs through north China and provides millions of people with water.38  This river, 
however, is a curse as well as a blessing.  The Chinese have tried to control the flooding 
of this river for centuries, but such efforts have been in vain.  The river has risen nearly 
70 feet in some locations and the Chinese still experience disastrous floods as a result.39  
Furthermore, in addition to severe flooding, the Yellow River is also becoming 
excessively polluted as a result of industrial waste and resource mismanagement.  
                                                 
38 Cleaner Production in China, Rivers and Lakes Identified for Environmental Protection, 




3. Ground Water 
Ground water reserves are created from rivers flowing over the land and seeping 
into the ground.  At this point, wells are drilled in order to access this water for drinking 
or agricultural irrigation.  China gets approximately 70 percent of its drinking water and 
about 40 percent of its agricultural irrigation waters from these sources.40  Therefore, it is 
clear that ground water is a major source of fresh water for China.  But these reserves are 
also feeling the effects of pollution and mismanagement.  There are numerous 
documented events of groundwater reserves being contaminated by local industrial 
plants.  For example, groundwater reserves in a small village outside of Beijing are being 
ruined due to a zinc-plating plant nearby.41  Although efforts are being made to resolve 
this issue, it is not receiving the amount of attention it warrants.  Yin Yueping (an expert 
with Chinese Geological Survey) states that “China’s groundwater management is about 
20 years behind the worlds’ most advanced levels.”42   
C. CHINA’S WATER RESOURCES: EXAMINING ITS PRIMARY USERS 
There are three primary consumers of China’s water supply: domestic users, 
agricultural users, and industrial users.  The overall consumption of China’s water is also 
on the rise.  In 1980, China’s water consumption was estimated to be approximately 
443.7 billion cubic meters.  As a result of increased demand, the overall usage rose to 
518.7 in 1993 and 543.5 in 1998 – a 22 percent increase from the 1980 figure.43  Due to 
the rate of growth expected in these areas, the demand on China’s water resources is 
expected to rise.  This level of growth without necessary safeguards only complicates the 
problem and some estimates suggests that by 2030, the 1998 water use estimate may 
                                                 
40 World Watch Institute, “China’s Groundwater Future Increasingly Murky,” Yan Zhan, 
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/4753 (accessed 19 November 2007). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., Fault Lines in China’s Economic Terrain (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), 
79. 
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double.44  More specifically, the increase in water use also increases the amount of waste 
water produced.45  Therefore, the issue of regional lake and river pollution is 
compounded.  Additionally, if consumption continues at this rate without plans to 
conserve, the volume of consumed fresh water will likely reach an unacceptable level in 
coming decades. 
1. Domestic Use 
China’s population is currently in excess of 1.3 billion, according to a July 2007 
Central Intelligence Agency estimate.46  China is the most populous country in the world, 
and its population is expected to rise to approximately 1.5 billion by 2030.47  Therefore, 
as the population rises, the overall water demand will also increase.  It is this rising 
demand that poses a major problem for China’s water reserves.  Additionally, this 
increase may eventually cause China’s domestic users to surpass the industrial and 
agricultural users as the biggest consumer on water. 
China’s increasing population is also causing a major dilemma for already over-
populated urban areas.  Therefore, there are major efforts being undertaken to increase 
the overall amount of freshwater accessible to those living in these urban areas – in some 
cases a deliberate diversion of water from rural to urban areas.  As a result, people living 
in rural areas are being forced to migrate into these urban areas in order to have access to 
the water.48  The impact that domestic use will have on China’s overall water resources is 
highlighted by Lester R. Brown, when he states that “between now and 2010, when 
China's population is projected to grow by 126 million, the World Bank projects that the 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 82. 
45 Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., Fault Lines in China’s Economic Terrain (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), 
82. 
46 Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book, China, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (accessed 21 November 2007).  
47 World Water Conservation, “China’s Water,” http://worldwaterconservation.com/chinawater1.html 
(accessed 21 November 2007). 
48 Gavan McCormack, “Water Margins: Competing Paradigms in China,” Critical Asian Studies, 33:1 
(2001). 
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country's urban water demand will increase from 50 billion cubic meters to 80 billion, a 
growth of 60 percent. Industrial water demand, meanwhile, will increase from 127 billion 
to 206 billion cubic meters, an expansion of 62 percent.”49 
2. Agricultural Use 
Agriculture is estimated to be the biggest consumer of China’s water supply; 
however, the overall increase in consumption has been relatively low in relation to the 
other consumers.50  The agricultural sector uses approximately 400 billion cubic meters 
of water, and its use is expected to rise to nearly 665 billion by 2030.51  This increase in 
production is primarily due to the growth of an affluent middle class that is beginning to 
consume more expensive products, such as pork, chicken, beef and eggs.52  Therefore, 
those employed in the agricultural sector are expected to increase output, which 
ultimately takes a major toll on the overall water resources available. 
The majority of China’s farmers are located in the dry northern provinces.  Due to 
the extreme conditions, these provinces rarely have access to river water as a majority of 
them dry up prior to reaching the plains.53  Consequently, these users are forced to tap 
into China’s precious ground water reserves.  The overuse of this source is causing great 
concern for Chinese environmentalists and Beijing.  It is causing a rapid decline in 
available groundwater for production and adds to China’s severe water dilemma.  
3. Industrial Use 
China’s obsession with economic growth is becoming one of the most significant 
contributors to its overall water shortage.  Lately, China is focusing all its attention on 
ensuring economic development with inadequate concern for the environment – evident 
                                                 
49 Lester R. Brown, “Worsening Water Shortages Threaten China’s Food Security,” http://www.earth-
policy.org/Updates/Update1.htm (accessed 21 November 2007). 
50 Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., Fault Lines in China’s Economic Terrain, 80. 
51 World Water Conservation, “China’s Water,” http://worldwaterconservation.com/chinawater1.html 
(accessed 21 November 2007). 
52 Ibid. 
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by its excessive use of coal and water resources throughout the country.54  Although 
China’s economic growth has been significant, it is imperative that it focus on balancing 
this goal with preserving the environment.  Otherwise, China is likely to see a decline in 
economic growth once the water is no longer useable.55 
The industrial use of water is also more profitable than the agricultural use.  It is 
estimated that “a thousand tons of water produces one ton of wheat, which has a market 
value of $200, whereas the same amount of water used in industry yields an estimated 
$14,000 of output – 70 times as much.”56  Therefore, it is clear that it is in Beijing’s best 
interest to ensure the industrial sector receives the lion’s share of available water 
resources.  As a result, China’s agricultural production will decrease and make it difficult 
for China to remain self-sufficient with regard to feeding its people.  Additionally, the 
lack of internal production may force China to import food, causing a possible decrease 
in its overall gross domestic product – China’s estimated 2004 agricultural exports were 
valued at 20.37 billion (USD).57 
D. THE ROAD TO CRISIS: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CHINA’S 
IMMINENT WATER EMERGENCY 
There are several factors contributing to China’s water crisis.  They include 
increasing demand, climate change, inefficient use, and pollution.  Of the four mentioned, 
increasing demand was discussed above in connection with increased population.  
Additionally, climate change is a serious problem.  As a matter of fact, it is a major issue 
for the glaciers located on the Tibetan Plateau that serve as the major source for China’s 
rivers.  However, the following sections tackle the most significant contributor to China’s 
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57 People’s Daily Online, “China’s Agricultural Exports to Grow 10 Percent in 2004,” 
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water crisis: inefficient use and pollution.  These two factors, if addressed by the Chinese 
government, could significantly lessen the growing water burden. 
1. Inefficient Use 
The current Chinese water crisis rests solely on the shoulders of the government.  
A myriad of ineffective laws (to be discussed in the follow-on sections) contribute to the 
current situation.  Current law allows water to be accessed for a fraction of the cost it 
should be and so give little incentive to conserve.  As a result, Chinese typically use the 
water as fast as they can get their hands on it.  Additionally, with the level of water 
quality going down, Chinese citizens are beginning to use it faster in order to ensure it is 
not completely unusable.  Finally, China’s limited water handling technology and 
inadequate concern for the resource, until now, adds to this problem. 
China’s irrigation system is extremely inefficient.  It is estimated that a majority 
of the water channeled through these systems seeps back into the ground prior to being 
utilized by the consumer.58  It is also estimated that approximately 400 million cubic 
meters of water is lost annually due to these irrigation systems.59  Due to these disturbing 
statistics, Chinese experts are calling on Beijing to make changes.  These experts are 
asking the government to “raise public awareness of water conservation, adopt new 
irrigation methods, and spread the use of water-efficient facilities.”60 
China’s use of dams to store water and generate hydroelectric power is also 
reaching a level of obsession.  In 2003, China, along with Turkey, Iran, and Japan, 
accounted for 67 percent of the world’s dams.  Additionally, China has a total of 88 dams 
under construction and another 36 planned.61  These dams are either poorly constructed 
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or aging.62  Furthermore, China does not comply with a 2000 report from the World 
Commission on Dams that states “the end of any dam project must be the sustainable 
improvement of human welfare. This means a significant advance of human development 
on a basis that is economically viable, socially equitable, and environmentally 
sustainable. If a large dam is the best way to achieve this goal it deserves our support.  
Where other options offer better solutions we should favor them over large dams.”63  
This is most clearly evident with respect to China’s construction of the Three Gorges 
Dam.  The overall environmental impact was immense and the human displacement total 
reached nearly 1.13 million people.64  These dams are not built with the environment in 
mind.  They are constructed to serve industrial and economic growth.  Until now, Beijing 
did not care about the repercussions.  Increasingly, China is caught between a rock and a 
hard place trying to revitalize the resource it is exhausting. 
2. Pollution 
Similar to the inefficient use of water, the degree of pollution plaguing China’s 
water can be tied back to Beijing’s ineffective management of the environment.  The 
primary reason for this problem appears to be ineffective and un-enforced environmental 
codes.  Additionally, industry bribes officials to overlook certain violations. 
The overall increase in water usage also generates an increase in waste water – 
nearly 21,000 chemical companies line China’s two main rivers.65  In combination with 
China’s obsessive damming efforts, this waste water is rendering most of China’s surface 
water unsuitable for use.  In 2006, “more than 26 billion tons of waste water was pumped 
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into the Yangtze, which flows through 11 Chinese provinces and municipalities.”66  
Joseph Kahn and Jim Yardley recently wrote that “public health is reeling. According to 
the Ministry of Public Health, pollution contributes to cancer as China’s leading cause of 
death.  Ambient air pollution alone is blamed for hundreds of thousands of deaths each 
year. Nearly 500 million people lack access to safe drinking water.”67  Furthermore, 
Khan and Yardley go on to say that “China is choking on its own success. The economy 
is on an historic run, posting a succession of double-digit growth rates. But the growth 
derives, now more than at any time in the recent past, from a staggering expansion of 
heavy industry and urbanization that requires colossal inputs of energy, almost all from 
coal, the most readily available, and dirtiest, source.”68 
Surface water is not the only source being impacted by this issue of pollution.  As 
the pollutants seep into the ground, it contaminates the soil being used for farming as well 
as the groundwater reserves.  The result of this excessive pollution, according to the 
National Environmental Protection Agency, is that “70 percent of China's rivers and lakes 
are polluted to some degree; the water of 28 percent is unsuitable even for irrigation. 
Moreover, 90 per cent of the ground water in the cities is too polluted to drink. As a 
result, several hundred million Chinese lack access to safe water.” 69  
E. GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD EXECUTION: BEIJING’S EFFORTS TO 
MITIGATE THIS CRISIS 
Historically, China’s concern for environmental issues has been limited.  
However, this is not to say it has been doing nothing – the current water laws indicate 
that Beijing is prioritizing environmental issues.  It is clear, however, that it is a 
secondary concern.  Moreover, China remains focused on the growth of its economy,  
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regardless of what costs it incurs along the way.  Unless Beijing reverses its existing laws 
and emphasizes enforcement, it will continue to combine good intentions with poor 
execution.  The result could be catastrophic. 
1. Beijing’s “Top-Down Approach” – The 1988 Water Law 
The “top-down” approach originates from Beijing’s centralized approach to 
governance and ties into water management through the 1988 Water Law – defined in 
Article 3.70  In order to execute this law, Beijing created the Ministry of Water Resources 
(MWR) with the responsibility of enforcing the state’s ownership of the water.  In order 
to complete this task, the MWR assigned water management duties to lower-level 
agencies – located near the rivers and basin areas.  The MWR then established a 
hierarchical system that requires all local agencies to periodically report back in order to 
keep Beijing informed through communication with the MWR.71  While this approach 
fits the overarching method of Chinese governance, it is extremely cumbersome and 
limits the amount of quality control China can actually impress upon this resource.  As a 
result, China continues to struggle with the deterioration of its water supply. 
China’s governing style also leaves little room for the consideration of opinion 
outside of Beijing’s politicians.  Moreover, China continues to focus a majority of its 
efforts on maintaining the well-being of the state.  Nevertheless, as the environmental 
situation becomes more dangerous, the public and some national constituents are 
becoming more vocal.  These efforts to influence Beijing, however, are currently fruitless 
as Beijing continues on its chosen path to build more dams and explore exploitation of 
the Tibetan Plateau.72  In order to more effectively deal with this crisis, it is imperative to 
do away with the antiquated top-down approach, adopt a more decentralized form of 
water management and revise and enforce current laws. 
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The top-down approach was doomed to fail from the outset.  It is maintained by 
relying on three main assumptions: First, the government maintains accurate measures of 
available national water supplies, local surface water supplies, and local groundwater 
resources.  Additionally, it assumes that the government can respond to any sudden 
changes in this supply.  Second, the government is capable of enforcing restrictions.  
Finally, the government is concerned about taking care of public interests by avoiding the 
acceptance of bribes or coercion by influential locals.73  In reality, these expectations 
cannot be accomplished for a number of reasons, including outdated data on water 
availability versus use, corruption, cost, and lack of inter-provincial coordination.  As a 
result, the top-down approach has spawned what is termed a “pump race.”74  In other 
words, it encourages people to get water before it is all gone.  Finally, this approach has 
also resulted in water disputes – in some cases violent ones.75  Under this law, the 
propensity for conflict to arise over water is high.  Therefore, Beijing needs to consider 
not only revising its laws, as was done in 2002, but also enforcing its laws.  Otherwise, 
water issues could become international problems – an event that could lead to conflict 
and regional instability. 
2. 2002 Water Law Revision 
The 2002 revision of China’s water law marks a significant step in China’s efforts 
to address this crisis.  While far from perfect, the law seeks to establish the concept of 
“water rights.”76  However, this change is being implemented in the old centralized 
methodology of governance.  In order to revamp the process, it is important that Beijing 
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such a decentralized approach “might involve water user associations and the public more 
generally.”77  This approach would help ensure that water users have incentives to 
conserve vice motivation to waste. 
The revisions to the 1988 water law lend credibility to Beijing’s efforts to 
implement change.  They include the “reiteration of the state ownership of water 
resources, defining the water use rights of the collective agricultural economic 
organizations, adding some control systems such as water amount allocation system, the 
combination of the total quantity control and quota management and sets up water 
abstraction rights.”78  These changes are a step in the right direction; however, the big 
step will be when Beijing truly decentralizes the system.  It is clear that Beijing is aware 
of the need for water rights, however, its reluctance to let go of the “top-down” approach 
leads researchers to believe that it remains focused on its primary goal of economic 
development or is highly corrupt.79  Nevertheless, the following three examples support 
the claim that Beijing’s focus toward implementing water rights is moving in the right 
direction: 1. the first effective transfer of water rights took place between Dongyang City 
and Yiwu City.  In this case, Dongyang transferred the use of 50 million cubic meters of 
water to Yiwu;80 2. In 2001-2002, the provinces of Shanxi and Henan transferred a total 
of 60 million cubic meters of water between each other;81 3. In 2004, the Yellow River, 
Ningxia and Inner Mongolia agreed to invest in water conservation projects and the 
transfer of water rights under the auspices of the MWR.  These agreements motivated 
eight large industrial projects to support the utilization of water rights.82 
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3. Colossal Water Diversion Projects: Beijing’s Near-Term Solution 
The extent of China’s water crisis has caused Beijing to propose two major 
projects that involve the transfer of water from one region to another.  The first is referred 
to as the south to north water diversion project.83  Proposed by Mao Zedong in 1952, this 
project is scheduled to be completed in 2050, and it will divert approximately 44.8 
million cubic meters of water to drier Northern provinces.84  Upon the completion of this 
massive project, the estimated cost of linking China’s four main rivers (the Yangtze 
River, the Yellow River, the Huaihe River, and the Haihe River) will be approximately 
$62 billion (USD) (see Figure 8).85 
 
Figure 8.   The South to North Water Diversion Project. 
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The benefits of this project are apparent, it will undoubtedly provide Northern 
China with the water it desperately needs.  However, like other major dam projects, this 
one also has severe consequences.  Like the Three Gorges Dam, the south-to-north water 
diversion project will displace many Chinese citizens – similar to the one million plus 
displaced during the building of the Three Gorges Dam.  The project also poses a risk to 
critical land required for farming.  Finally, Beijing plans to build additional industrial 
complexes along the routes of the project.  The additional industries may add to the water 
pollution problem Beijing is trying to combat. 
The second major project is referred to as the great western route diversion 
project.86  This project causes the most concern for China’s neighbors, and it is the most 
contentious.  However, there are limited details on the size, scope, and reality of this 
project.  Additionally, despite what some unnamed sources in Beijing claim, government 
officials vehemently deny any intention to move forward with such a project.87  In 
response to these allegations, China’s Minister for Water Resources, Wang Shucheng, 
said that this project is "unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific."88  Regardless of 
Beijing’s actual intentions, the decision to move forward with this plan could cause 
severe tension between China and India. 
F. CHINESE WATER SCARCITY: THE CONSEQUENCES 
There are numerous consequences that may result from China’s water dilemma.  
However, the three major consequences include a severe impact on Chinese citizens, a 
possible economic regression, and the potential for international conflict.  The fact that 
Chinese citizens are beginning to voice their opinions – although not totally being heard  
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yet – on the severity of this crisis leaves responsibility for change on Beijing’s shoulders.  
As the research shows, it is imperative that Beijing assess China’s environmental crisis 
before it is too late. 
1. Are Beijing’s Policies Killing China’s People? 
Beijing’s focus on economic development is placing industry first and its 
environment second.  As a result, Beijing is focusing on massive projects to harness 
water in order to make power – such as the Three Gorges Dam.  Additionally, it is also 
focusing on massive projects to remedy the problem its policies are causing – such as the 
south-north water diversion project and the great western route water transfer project.  
These projects are costing billions of dollars, causing severe water pollution problems in 
urban and rural areas alike, and resulting in massive migrations of people from these 
areas with little compensation.  For China to begin managing this problem, it must shift 
its focus solely on economic development to managing the whole picture.  This involves 
not only developing more efficient ways to conserve water, but also an effort to revise 
and enforce the water laws. 
2. Economic Regression 
The irony of Beijing’s primary focus on economic development is that it may 
eventually contribute to its demise.89  Moreover, the volume of waste water dumped into 
China’s rivers and lakes renders existing water supplies unusable.  China’s industries, 
which are highly reliant on water and coal for power, may be unable to sustain their 
current pace of production.  Therefore, China’s current booming growth may bottom out 
or recede.  This underscores the importance of water conservation for Beijing.  In other 
words, China’s current prosperity is directly related to the country’s water quality, and it 
will be required to make some serious changes with regard to its current industrial 
operations. 
                                                 
89 Jacques DeLisle, “China Rising: Assessing China’s Economic and Military Power,” 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200710.delisle.chinarising.html (accessed 26 November 2007). 
 31
3. Interstate Conflict 
The most problematic outcome of this crisis is the potential for international 
conflict.  This is the case because it not only affects the countries involved, but it also 
disrupts regional stability.  Historically, water problems have provoked conflict.90  
China’s current water crisis may portend future conflict.  In other words, it is apparent 
that attempts to modify the existing rivers in China may impact its neighbors – who are 
also experiencing water shortages.  This emphasizes the importance of developing water 
sharing agreements. 
China has already completed numerous projects that have angered its neighbors.  
These include dam projects on the Mekong that affect Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and 
Thailand.  Additionally, China’s past and future plans to construct dams on the 
Brahmaputra River have also caused great concern in India.91  Finally, Chinese plans to 
tap the resources of the Tibetan Plateau are the most significant cause of concern – 
although Beijing is reluctant to share specifics regarding its plans.92  There are severe 
implications if Beijing goes forward with such plans without international agreement.  
More specifically, the plans to utilize this resource could affect not only Southeast Asia 
but the rivers of China’s more volatile nuclear neighbors, India and Pakistan, who already 
experience tension over water sharing. 
G. CONCLUSION 
China’s water crisis will get worse before it gets better – if it gets better at all.  
There are numerous reasons why water is becoming a major dilemma for Beijing because 
of over population, pollution and mismanagement.  However, the most important priority 
to examine is what Beijing is doing to mitigate the problem.  China’s water crisis has the 
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potential to generate severe consequences.  These include, but are certainly not limited to, 
massive human suffering, economic regression and the potential for interstate conflict. 
Beijing is attempting to change its current water governance infrastructure.  This 
is not to accuse Beijing of lack of action.  However, it is to raise awareness that it may 
not be doing enough.  Beijing still utilizes top-down methods to the issues, and it is clear 
that its focus is not adequately on the environment.  The first step in making positive 
changes requires Beijing to decentralize its water governance sector.  If this is 
accomplished, it will likely give teeth to the recently revised water law and possibly start 
an upward trend of water conservation.   
Beijing’s top-down approach is causing it to overlook effective solutions to this 
dilemma.  It is currently ignoring calls to limit the scale of dams and major projects being 
pursued.  Thus far, it has already completed the Three Gorges Dam.  It is in the process 
of constructing the south to north water diversion project and it has numerous other dams 
planned in the future.  It is reluctant to consider and implement more cost effective 
methods to address this issue.  For example, Beijing is hesitant to raise the price of water 
– a solution that would certainly persuade people to conserve.  Additionally, it is unclear 
what Beijing’s stance is on desalinization plants. 
The possible consequences of this water crisis are intimidating.  Of the three 
discussed, the most serious is the possibility of international conflict between China, 
India and Pakistan.  China’s construction of dams or water diversion projects on the 
Tibetan Plateau would severely exacerbate regional water tensions.  The implications of 
such plans would affect more than just India and Pakistan.  But the potential for a nuclear 
exchange shifts the focus to this triad.  It is unclear whether Beijing is considering these 
ramifications during its planning sessions, but it is imperative that it do so.  A decision to 
ignore its neighbors during this time of water scarcity could result in disastrous 
consequences. 
China’s water crisis is reaching a dangerous point.  The IV and DV model 
addressed in figure four highlight the possible outcomes for this impending crisis.  
China’s IV’s are reaching a level where the potential for cooperation or competition are 
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becoming a reality.  If China’s dwindling water supply is allowed to reach an 
unacceptable level, it will be forced to take action which will likely include exploiting the 
resources of the Tibetan Plateau.   
Beijing’s proposed plans to tap into the water resources of the Tibetan Plateau are 
in the development stage.  There are no interstate agreements between China, India, and 
Pakistan that delineate who can tap into the headwaters of the Indus, Brahmaputra, and 
the Ganges Rivers.  Therefore, if Beijing puts these plans into action without any 
interstate agreements, it could lead to significant competition over these resources 
resulting in war.  The only action that could lead to the more desirable outcome of 
interstate agreement is to be proactive and help these countries develop water sharing 
agreements that could foster cooperation vice competition. 
The following chapter will discuss the challenges facing South Asia.  More 
specifically, it will examine the role that India and Pakistan play in this potential crisis 
over dwindling water resources.  It will examine the history of tension between these 
states, the issues surrounding their water scarcity and efforts to mitigate the potential for 
conflict over these dwindling resources. 
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III. THE SOUTH ASIAN WATER CRISIS: THE PROBLEM, 
CAUSES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Wars will be fought between nations over water. 
- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan93 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 gave birth to a long history of 
conflict between India and Pakistan.  The region remains prone to conflict and instability 
as a result of these deep-seated tensions.  The source of this instability primarily revolves 
around several major issues.  Of these issues, the Kashmir region remains the most 
contentious.  Despite decades of multilateral and bilateral talks over Kashmir, the issue 
remains contentious, unresolved and the primary source of water resource tension 
between India and Pakistan.94 
The possibility for a total war over Kashmir, given the nuclear capability of both 
countries, seems unlikely.  However, the strategic importance of Kashmir cannot be 
underestimated.  Additionally, the history of instability between the two countries 
suggests that conflict could break out overnight and with little warning.  Thus, it is 
unclear to what lengths these countries would go in order to achieve their goals – control 
of Kashmir and the precious natural resources associated with it.   
The rivers flowing from the Kashmir region (ultimately originating in the Tibetan 
Plateau) into Pakistan are the life-blood of this agriculturally based country.  India cut off 
the flow of this river in 1948, and any new attempt to repeat this action may prove 
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catastrophic.  The propensity to go to war over water has been high.95  Therefore, it is 
likely that another attempt to stem the flow of the Indus River by either country would 
result in conflict – and possibly a nuclear one. 96   
This chapter examines the historical tensions present between India and Pakistan.  
The ongoing tension over water resources in the Kashmir region and the water dilemma 
these countries are currently facing may set the stage for unfavorable responses to 
Chinese attempts to dam the Tibetan Plateau.  The chapter examines critical events such 
as the hasty partition of the Indian subcontinent, the signing of the 1960 Indus Water 
Treaty, the various terms agreed upon in it, and whether these aspects of can serve as a 
model for the impending crisis between China, India, and Paksitan. 
B. THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICT: THE PARTITION OF INDIA AND 
PAKISTAN 
The prospect that India and Pakistan will go to war over water is rooted in their 
enduring rivalry, and the military conflicts that they have engaged in.97  The rivalry 
between India and Pakistan stems from the two visions of statehood that arose in the 
nationalist movement while the Indian subcontinent was under the rule of the British 
from 1858-1947.98  The first vision was developed by the Indian National Congress 
(INC) who wanted a unified country built around the doctrine of secularism and liberal 
democracy.99  The second vision materialized from a group of Muslim leaders that 
became distrustful of majority rule and demanded safeguards to protect Muslim interests 
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within this Hindu-dominated party.100  As a result, they created the Muslim League in 
1906 – the vehicle they used to acquire separate electorates.101  It was these two visions 
that eventually led to the partition. 
Internal tension between these two parties came to a head on August 15, 1947 
with the birth of India and Pakistan as independent states.102  The poor handling of the 
partition and the violent mass migration of people exacerbated the tensions between the 
two, leading to decades of conflict.  Furthermore, the delineated boundaries set the stage 
for tensions over water.  The major issue was the fact that the headwaters of the Indus 
were located in India, and the lower basin was in Pakistan.103  This placed India at an 
obvious advantage, with the ability to control the source of water flowing into Pakistan.  
Adding to the tension was the fact that there was no method to manage the sharing of the 
water of the Indus system. 
The speed with which this decision was made became the focal point of this 
problem.  In other words, the heart of the problem was the feeling that it took more than 
two centuries to build this empire and ten days to decide to split it.  In addition, Sir Cyril 
Radcliffe’s hasty and sloppy creation of the borders – drawn based on religious 
populations in only 36 days – created the basis for subsequent India-Pakistan tensions.104  
The enduring rivalry between these two countries can therefore be traced back to three 
main issues: the manner in which the 1947 partition was conducted; the Kashmir 
question; and the division of assets. 
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C. 1948: THE REASON FOR THE INDUS WATER TREATY 
On 12 August 1947, a standstill agreement was proposed as a method to maintain 
order between the newly born states.  The agreement, as incorporated into the Indian 
Independence Act 1947, called for a status quo until new agreements were set down 
between the two parties.105  The problem, however, was that Pakistan immediately 
accepted the agreement, but India tried to negotiate the terms – ultimately leading to 
India’s rejection.106  India’s rejection of the agreement led Pakistan to distrust of New 
Delhi’s intentions regarding accession.107  The eventual expiration of this agreement on 1 
April 1948 – and the lack of any water sharing agreement – laid the groundwork for 
India’s eventual decision to stem the flow of the Indus River.108 
India’s decision to stem the flow of the Indus River followed its realization that 
no water sharing agreement prevented it.  Therefore, on 1 April 1948, India stemmed the 
flow of the water flowing into the Dipalpur Canal and the main branches of the Upper 
Bari Daab Canal.109  India’s motivation for stemming the flow is unclear, but there are a 
number of theories that attempt to explain India’s intentions in light of the political 
situation in 1948.  The first theory revolves around legal issues and the fact that the upper 
riparian state – India – was attempting to establish its sovereign water rights.110  A 
second, more likely scenario, includes India’s desire to pressure Pakistan on the Kashmir 
issue.  In other words, India wanted Pakistan to realize its dependence on India in the 
hopes of forcing reconciliation.111  A third theory is that the action was taken by the 
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Indian provincial government of East Punjab.  The theory holds that East Punjab decided 
to stem the flow of the Indus without the approval of the central government.112 
India’s successful disruption of the river underscored Pakistan’s vulnerability 
under its larger neighbor.  Furthermore, despite India’s decision to resume the flow of 
water into Pakistan a month later, it made it clear that a water sharing agreement was 
critical to mitigate this obvious problem and preserve Pakistan’s economic viability.113  
Therefore, in 1951, the negotiation process for a permanent water sharing agreement 
began. 
D. 1960 INDUS WATER TREATY 
The period from 1951-1960 foreshadowed how future negotiations would go 
between these two nations – except for the fact that this process resulted in an eventual 
agreement.  The decision to enter negotiations came after years of frustration over the 
lack of a treaty and the fact that the two sides stopped meeting on the issue in 1951.114  
The overall process was arduous and frustrating for both parties involved, but the final 
product was eventually agreed upon by everyone.115  In fact, the treaty became the only 
agreement that India and Pakistan mutually implemented and adhered to.116 
The agreements set forth in the treaty helped maintain peace in South Asia for 
decades.  The key components of the treaty demonstrated that India and Pakistan could 
work together if the payoff was large enough.  The first key part of the treaty involves the 
division of the Indus River system.  This system consists of three eastern rivers – the 
Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi, and three western rivers – the Indus, the Jhelum and the 
Chenab.  The treaty gave India exclusive rights to the three eastern rivers up to the point 
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where they enter Pakistan.  At the same time, Pakistan was given exclusive rights to the 
western rivers.117  The second key aspect was the creation of the Indus Commission.  
This commission was created to adjudicate future disputes over the allocation of water 
and required annual meetings to discuss any potential problems.118   
Despite the treaty’s success over the past decades, India and Pakistan have 
experienced numerous disputes over modifications to the rivers – some of which remain 
unsettled.  The increasing need to maintain a steady flow of water for survival and the 
recent rise in disagreements over aspects of the treaty raise the question of whether the 
treaty is still adequate.  In addition, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and 
Pakistan raises the stakes in any serious dispute over these rivers.  India and Pakistan 
must review the treaty and update it where appropriate.  Otherwise, the historical success 
of the treaty may come to an end. 
E. NUCLEAR NATIONS 
Like China’s acquisition of the bomb, India and Pakistan’s evolution into regional 
nuclear powers changed the stakes of total war forever.  These declared nuclear states 
will now have to carefully weigh every decision to wage war.  In particular, the 
perception that India directly threatens the survivability of Pakistan may convince 
Pakistan to use nuclear weapons as a last resort.  In fact, the nuclear doctrines of India 
and Pakistan paint a scary picture that supports the possibility of nuclear exchange if 
certain red lines are crossed. 
India’s nuclear doctrine is much different from Pakistan’s.  The National Security 
Advisory Board published India’s draft doctrine in 1999.  India, unlike Pakistan, does not 
have any stated nuclear red lines.  In fact, it proclaims a retaliatory, no first-use policy 
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with the goal of nuclear deterrence.119  Therefore, concern arises from the possibility of a 
nuclear strike from Pakistan.  If initiated, the outcome of a nuclear volley would be 
catastrophic, leaving the countries devastated and regional security in shambles. 
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is shrouded in secrecy.  However, there are a number 
of public statements by senior Pakistani officials that help clarify the picture.  Major 
General Khalid Kidwai, in a late 2000 interview, illuminated critical elements of 
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine.  First and foremost, it is obvious that Pakistan’s nuclear 
doctrine is directed at India.  Second, he plainly laid out the red lines that, if crossed, 
would cause Pakistan to use nuclear weapons against India.  These scenarios include the 
loss of a large part of Pakistan’s territory, destruction of a large part of Pakistan’s 
military, economic strangulation, or other attempts to politically destabilize Pakistan.120 
The looming tensions over water resources highlight the importance of the 
economic strangulation red line.  This red line seems to be the most likely to be crossed; 
however, it is important to note that this red line reportedly consists of two parts – 
stemming the water from the Indus River and simultaneously blockading key Pakistani 
ports.  However, it is unknown whether Pakistan will wait until both are accomplished.  If 
it perceives that India is posing a clear and present danger to its survival as a state, it may 
resort to the use of nuclear weapons.  Therefore, it is clear that the problem should be 
resolved before it spirals out of control, given the many ongoing tensions over aspects of 
the Indus Water Treaty that challenge the relevance of the treaty.  
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F. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES: IS THE TREATY STILL 
RELEVANT? 
The 1960 Indus Water Treaty is a satisfactory agreement that requires 
modifications to limit the potential for future conflict over water sharing – especially in 
view of the potential for a nuclear exchange.  Despite its success, four major issues feed 
these tensions.  They include the controversial decision to approve the construction of the 
Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River, the unsettled Kishenganga Dam project (sometimes 
referred too as the Wullar or Wular Barrage) that affects the Jhelum River (Figure 9), the 
potential construction of the Iran-Pakistan-India (I-P-I) oil pipeline, and China’s 
proposed plan to tap into water sources on the Tibetan Plateau.121  The main point of 
contention with regard to these issues is that, according to the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, 
Pakistan has rights to the Chenab and Jhelum rivers.  Therefore, it is clear why tensions 
are high and Pakistan is making India’s life miserable with regard to the completion of 
these river projects.  Furthermore, the I-P-I pipeline could provide Pakistan with an 
unacceptable political lever, in India’s eyes, that could be used when needed. 
 
Figure 9.   The Wullar Barrage Project. 
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The dam projects raise serious concerns for Pakistan.  Its main concern is the 
uncertainty of India’s intentions and whether the water will be used for something other 
than power generation – similar to its reasons for stemming the flow of essential rivers in 
1948.  Pakistan argues that India is trying to divert the river water, ultimately reducing 
the flow of the essential resource into Pakistan’s highly agrarian economy.122  If these 
projects are approved, it may place India in a position to control the flow of these rivers 
or use the dams in an offensive manner by flooding key Pakistani terrain.  Additionally, it 
also reinforces Pakistan’s feelings of vulnerability to its powerful neighbor – a position 
that could encourage the use of nuclear weapons in a desperate situation. 
The I-P-I pipeline could provide Pakistan with a significant lever over India – 
politically and militarily (see Figure 10).  India’s dependence on oil and gas increases 
along with its growing population.  Therefore, Pakistan’s ability to use this pipeline is a 
major concern for India.  If completed, Pakistan could use its presence as a means to 
acquire financial gains through taxes and as a counter to any future threat by India to cut 
off the flow of any rivers.  The ability to use the I-P-I pipeline as a lever does provide 
Pakistan with an adequate counter to India’s ability to control the rivers.  However, it 
does not alleviate the tensions between these countries. 
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Figure 10.   The I-P-I Pipeline. 
Finally, the 1960 Water Treaty does not include India and Pakistan’s neighbors.  
Therefore, it highlights the lack of water sharing agreements between these countries.  As 
previously discussed, these major rivers originate in Chinese territory.  For that reason, it is 
critical that the existing water treaty include China and the resources of the Tibetan Plateau, 
or the three conclude a new treaty.  The development of such a treaty may not totally 
eliminate the possibility of war over these resources.  However, it will certainly ensure that 
India and Pakistan have a voice in future Chinese projects focused on this region. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The preponderance of evidence indicates that the world’s water resources are 
diminishing at a rapid rate.  Additionally, the requirement for more water, due to 
increased energy needs and population growth, is becoming the source of increased 
competition between countries and the foundation for conflict.  China, India and Pakistan 
are examples of where water scarcity is becoming a major concern, and a lack of action 
could result in catastrophic results. 
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India and Pakistan’s enduring rivalry provides the groundwork for an 
unpredictable relationship between these regional powers.  The partition instilled a 
mutual distrust that persists today.  Exacerbated by the growing water crisis, the potential 
for conflict between these countries is high.  Furthermore, the possession of nuclear 
weapons by these countries raises the stakes of the game. 
The potential for all-out nuclear exchange is low.  However, the potential in light 
of serious disputes over water resources raises serious concerns for parties interested in 
maintaining regional security.  So, it is important to ensure that water issues be 
considered in future diplomatic efforts to ensure regional stability.  In other words, 
interested external powers should consider a proactive approach instead of a reactive one.  
The propensity between these countries for conflict makes a reactive approach 
undesirable.  In the event of a nuclear exchange, China, India and Pakistan would be 
decimated in minutes and the long-term effects on regional security would last for 
decades to follow. 
The stability of the South Asian region is important for a number of reasons.  
These countries have a history of tense relations that tend to lead to conflict.  Therefore, 
in order to engage these countries effectively, it may be important to address them 
separately at first – similar to China’s current approach to regional relations.123  As South 
Asia approaches a water crisis, the 1960 Indus Water Treaty is a good starting point – as 
it appears to pose the most relevant challenge as far as large-scale engagement is 
concerned.  If China and South Asia cannot settle potential disputes over water, it may be 
up to a fourth party, such as the United States, to motivate change. 
India and Pakistan share a similar fate with regard to China.  They also are 
reaching a level of water scarcity deemed to be unacceptable by international standards.  
Additionally, India and Pakistan are dependant on water sources that originate from the 
Tibetan Plateau.  Finally, these countries both possess nuclear weapons.  Unlike China, 
however, India and Pakistan are not proposing plans to unilaterally exploit the water 
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resources of the Tibetan Plateau.  Despite historical tension over water resources in the 
Kashmir region, India and Pakistan proved that agreements over water resources can be 
developed.  Therefore, India and Pakistan will likely be willing to negotiate a plan with 
China over the resources of the Tibetan Plateau if requested to do so.  However, if China 
turns rhetoric into action without attempting to produce an interstate agreement over 
these resources, India and Pakistan will be left with no other choice but to wage war over 
the water resources of the Tibetan Plateau. 
The final chapter will serve as a method to revisit the major issues discussed in 
the thesis.  It will also highlight the lack of any standard forum for these countries to 
conduct conflict resolution regarding these issues.  Finally, it will provide some 
recommendations and final analysis regarding the water crisis and hopefully serve as a 




IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARIZING THE ISSUES 
This thesis has identified facts and figures indicating that the water supply in 
China, India, and Pakistan is diminishing at an alarming rate.  It underlines the fact that 
the potential for conflict over water in Asia remains on the backburner while the 
international community focuses all its efforts on oil resources and climate change.  The 
decision to continue to ignore this problem may result in catastrophic consequences 
leading to regional instability and possibly armed conflict.  Therefore, it is imperative to 
focus attention on this problem before it spirals out of control. 
China’s current efforts to remedy its internal water crisis prove they are aware of 
the problem.  In fact, the statistics show that China will be unable to sustain its population 
with fresh water by 2025.  As a result, it is initiating numerous water projects designed to 
solve its crisis.  However, China continues to focus its efforts on the Tibetan Plateau’s 
rich water resources – an area that supplies almost half the world’s population with fresh 
water and lacking any water sharing agreements between the sharing countries.  As a 
result, China’s efforts, if left unsupervised, could affect major water lifelines that feed 
India and Pakistan. 
India and Pakistan’s history of tension indicate that regional conflict and 
destabilization is possible barring effective diplomatic actions or agreements – evident 
with successes due to the 1960 Indus Water Treaty.  However, China and South Asia 
have a checkered past.  They have all participated in some sort of regional conflict since 
the partition of India and tensions remain from these encounters.  Therefore, the potential 
for violence to arise over these issues is possible.124  Additionally, these countries, 
specifically Pakistan, have identified thresholds that recognize its intolerance toward any 
effort to impact the unimpeded access to natural resources. 
                                                 
124 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “U.S. Policy Toward Asia,” 18 June 2008, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/06/106034.htm (accessed 25 July 2008). 
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The potential for interstate conflict over the water resources of the Tibetan Plateau 
are high if actions to alleviate the dwindling water resources of China, India, and Pakistan 
are not taken.  As identified in figure four of the introduction, these countries all have 
characteristics that lay the ground work for potential conflict over water resources.  
Currently, there are no international efforts to assist these countries in the development of 
an agreement to share the resources of the Tibetan Plateau.  If allowed to deteriorate at 
this pace, China, India, and Pakistan will be forced to exploit any available water 
resources in order to ensure the survival of their populations.  As is true in human nature, 
the will to survive trumps all other instincts.  For that reason, it is reasonable to assume 
that China, India, and Pakistan will do what is necessary to ensure its survivability.   
Senator Gary Hart stated that “the key to dealing with these types of international 
crises is to address them before they become a problem.”125  Therefore, it is critical to 
foster cooperation before this crisis reaches a level of competition.  The result of 
competition will be interstate war – a result only likely if China decides to execute 
proposed plans to exploit the Tibetan Plateau without interstate agreements.  The result of 
cooperation will be the creation of interstate agreements over these water resources.  The 
latter result will not only benefit U.S. regional affairs, but it will likely assist in ensuring 
these resources are utilized in a fair and effective manner – ultimately maintaining 
regional stability. 
B. ASIAN FOREIGN POLICY: WHAT DOES THE U.S. HAVE TO LOSE? 
The rise of Asian countries is a topic of numerous policy debates currently taking 
place in Washington.  In fact, during a recent 2008 press conference, Secretary 
Condoleezza Rice stated that “the rise of Asia is a profound geopolitical trend that is 
reshaping our world today.”126  The overall mission of the Department of State is very 
clear with regard to international affairs.  It is committed to “advance freedom for the 
benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and 
                                                 
125 Senator Gary Hart, Phone Interview, 24 July 2008. 
126 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “U.S. Policy Toward Asia,” 18 June 2008, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/06/106034.htm (accessed 25 July 2008). 
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sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed 
states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act 
responsibly within the international system.”127  This statement highlights a key aspect 
toward U.S. policy that includes the desire to maintain peace and prosperity.  It is clear 
that instability in Asia could wreak havoc on U.S. goals and desires to continue effective 
international affairs in this region. 
Currently, the U.S. is heavily engaged in Asia in order to achieve its stated 
foreign affairs goals.  More specifically, the U.S. is more sighted on solving two major 
regional issues: 1. the motivation behind China’s military build up; and 2. the 
denuclearization of North Korea.128  With that in mind, it is safe to assume that 
secondary issues such as regional water scarcity issues are being overlooked.  It is in the 
best interests of the U.S. to refocus their efforts on solving this crisis.  If left unattended, 
it may spiral into an unfixable problem. 
The research clearly indicates that scarce water supplies are a major concern for 
China, India, and Pakistan.  As a result, the continued depletion of this commodity will 
likely be a significant flash point for regional destabilization if ignored.  The U.S. is 
attempting to address world wide climate change issues; however, it may not be placing 
enough emphasis on isolated problem areas such as water.  The climate change dilemma 
is clearly an important issue.  However, the topic of water scarcity is also as important 
and arguably inseparable from the climate change issue.129  Therefore, it should be 
addressed at the same level in order to ensure the problem is dealt with in a timely 
manner.   
U.S. efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Asian region are clear.  The U.S. 
has been heavily invested in the Asian region for decades.  It has fostered great alliances 
with Japan and South Korea.  Additionally, it is making progress with other Asian 
                                                 
127 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012,” 4, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf (accessed 26 July 2008). 
128 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “U.S. Policy Toward Asia,” 18 June 2008. 
129 Senator Gary Hart, Phone Interview, July 24, 2008. 
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countries such as China.130  Therefore, it is clear that the stakes are high.  The U.S. has a 
lot to lose if regional stability falls apart.  So, it is necessary to examine its ability to 
handle the issue.  If nothing exists to handle the impending water crisis, it is imperative to 
create an institution charged with solving the problem to ensure the U.S. can continue to 
effectively conduct foreign affairs in Asia.   
C. PRESERVING NATURAL RESOURCES: ARE WE SET UP TO 
SUCCEED? 
The international community is not designed to handle conflict resolution 
surrounding issues of natural resources and climate change.  According to Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice, “there is no established forum in Northeast Asia for the major 
powers to discuss their security concerns together.”131  Therefore, it is clear that the 
international community, possibly spearheaded by the U.S., needs to create a process to 
address these concerns.  There are numerous countries that successfully developed 
agreements over shared resources.  However, some of these agreements were developed 
under duress and are out dated – the 1960 Indus Water treaty being a prime example.  
Additionally, there are countries like China that share resources with numerous neighbors 
that lack any sort of guidance with regard to these resources.  This lack of consensus 
serves as a major source of conflict if desires are turned into actions.   
The international community is filled with agencies focused on environmental 
protection.  In fact, China, India, and Pakistan all have their own version of the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  However, these agencies are not charged with the 
task of conflict management.  For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is 
responsible for “protecting human health and the environment.”132  These agencies are 
interested in solving the climate change dilemma and addressing environmental concerns 
not resolving possible conflicts over shared resources.  They are a step in the right 
direction in order to address one aspect of this dilemma, however, the solution likely rests 
                                                 
130 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “U.S. Policy Toward Asia,” 18 June 2008. 
131 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “U.S. Policy Toward Asia,” 18 June 2008. 
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in creating an institution capable of filling the void identified by Secretary Rice’s 
comment regarding the lack of a Northeast Asian forum capable of dealing with conflict 
resolution. 
D. FINAL ANALYSIS 
The potential for conflict to arise between China, India, and Pakistan over these 
shared water resources is possible if the problem continues to be overlooked.  Although 
resorting to armed conflict is not the only possible response, it is the most serious with 
regard to maintain regional stability.  With that in mind, it is critical to ensure steps are 
taken to address this issue before these countries need to decide whether military or 
diplomatic measures should be taken. 
Asia is a volatile region currently experiencing a relatively high degree of peace, 
prosperity and stability.  However, as history indicates, the ball could drop overnight.  It 
is clear that Asian countries will resort to armed conflict if provoked, and it is in the best 
interest of the U.S. to prevent this from taking place.  Therefore, it is critical to begin 
looking at possible solutions to the problem which include drafting a water sharing 
agreement between China, India, and Pakistan.  Additionally, it would be prudent to 
develop a method for these countries to resolve conflicts on the international stage.  It 
would not only allow them a chance to diplomatically resolve points of tension, but it 
would allow the U.S. to weigh in, if required. 
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